IronKey - Ultimate Data Protection

[th3st1ck]

http://www.thinkgeek.com/gadgets/security/99f1/

Passwords can be hacked, but not the IronKey. It's built to withstand attacks both virtual and physical. 10 incorrect password attempts, and the encryption chip self-destructs, making the contents of the flash drive totally unreadable. The contents of the drive are filled with epoxy, so if a hacker tries to physically access the chips, he'd more likely damage them instead. Even if he did get access to the memory chips, they'd be worthless without the encryption chip. Electron-shielded, even a scanning electron microscope can't get inside.

...Your passwords are securely stored in a hidden hardware-encrypted area inside the device (and not in the drive's file system), being first locally encrypted with 256-bit AES, using randomly generated keys encrypted with a SHA-256 hash of your device password. All of this data is then doubly encrypted with 128-bit AES hardware encryption. Hack that...

need to get me one of these...

[{CLR}geneSW]

Interesting, very very interesting.

[random_id]

Sounds like teh encryption chip uses the same technology as teh SIMcard/SmartCards (permanent damage to itself if a certain code is used)...

P.S: For a cheaper alternatives, there's this:
http://www.newegg.com/Product/Produc...82E16820233058
and a totally free program:
http://www.truecrypt.org/

[L_Mo]

This is really interesting technology. The first rule in digital security is denying physical access, so this thing is probably quite secure. That being said, the data on my USB stick is my life, but I wouldn't mind if someone copied everything and looked at it (I make nightly backups). I need someone to start proofreading the chapters of my thesis anyway...

What's with that SEM comment in the description? I'm pretty sure you can't use an SEM to analyze memory chip, even if it's removed from the packaging...

[th3st1ck]

What's with that SEM comment in the description? I'm pretty sure you can't use an SEM to analyze memory chip, even if it's removed from the packaging...

who knows...they probably just put it there to make it sound cool :P

most people probably dont know what one is anyway lol

[random_id]

What's with that SEM comment in the description? I'm pretty sure you can't use an SEM to analyze memory chip, even if it's removed from the packaging...

You can, actually, it's called Beam-injection analysis, but it's used to detect teh defects in chips, not to extract data out of them... Look at teh Wikipedia's entry on that:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scannin...ron_microscope

[mapes]

It's possible to use a SEM to read the state of certain silicone there by being able to read the contents of the chip. However using a SEM on some silicone will destroy the state or reprogram the hardware. Interesting article

http://events.ccc.de/camp/2007/Fahrp...s/1933.en.html

[L_Mo]

Interesting article Mapes... In that system, though, isn't SEM is just used to find your way around? You'd use the FIB to cut off the leads to each transistor and then probe their states the same way the circuit would read off the data.

As far as beam injection - that is pretty much used w/ optical semiconductors (direct bandgap - GaAs, InP... etc.), but memory is made w/ silicon (indirect bandgap). It would still create some conducting electrons in the source and drain, but as far as I understand that still won't help you probe the floating gate on the transistor.

Anyway, I'm not actually not sure about using an SEM itself anymore. I know how to use SEMs (and use them frequently), but I wasn't sure how the memory was stored on the flash chips. After looking into it, if it is possible, it's extremely difficult and you're more likely destroy the data. Basically, the memory state is stored in the a floating gate, which is located under the gate of an otherwise normal MOSFET (transistor). If the floating gate is charged, incoming electrons from the SEM could feel this charge, but you'd have to find a way to get around the insulator. If your beam current is too high, you're going to trap charges in the insulator, and end up charging the floating gate (whether it was charged or not...), destroying the data. The control gate is grounded to the rest of the circuit, so it's going to shield the effects of the other gate, too.

In the end, I'm leaning towards thinking that the combination of the insulator and the control gate would make it impossible to see anything.

[mapes]

To be honest I know almost next to nothing about SEM's but, I do know a few years back they were used for reverse engineering in hardware devices...somehow.